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-SUPREME COURT REPORT 
Pleading the Fourth 
Plaintiffs may be able to sue under seizure law in high-speed chases 
BY KATHRYN R. URBONYA 
The U.S. Supreme Court 
recently erected a nearly insur-
mountable roadblock to lawsuits 
under the 14th Amendment for 
injuries or deaths caused by 
high-speed police chases. But 
some plaintiffs may have a way 
around that obstacle. 
The Court's May ruling in 
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 
118 S. Ct. 1708, held that the 
14th Amendment, which pro-
tects an individual's liberty, im-
poses liability only if pursuing 
officers acted maliciously, with 
an intent to hurt the pursued. 
ference to a confined in-
dividual's serious med-
ical needs is shocking 
conduct, according to 
the Court. Deliberate in-
difference to the risk of 
injury during a high-
speed pursuit is not. 
The difference be-
tween these two scenar-
ios is that the pursuing 
police officer has little 
time to reflect before 
acting. As a result, only 
malice will suffice to 
prove shocking conduct 
in a high-speed pursuit. 
The next avenue 
But plaintiffs may be able 
to pursue another theory of lia-
,bility. If a police chase amounts 
to an unreasonable seizure-if 
an officer intentionally rams a 
suspect's vehicle and causes a 
crash, for example-the plain-
tiff may be able to sue for the 
Fourth Amendment violation. 
Because quick decisions must be made during a vehicular 
pursuit, malice must be proven on the part of the police. 
· for litigation is the 
Fourth Amendment. To 
challenge a pursuit un-
der it, plaintiffs must 
prove there was a sei-
zure-a difficult task-
and that it was unrea-
sonable. 
It seems that driving skills 
matter when police are seeking a 
shield from liability. Better to have 
an accident, as the facts in Lewis 
illustrate. 
The plaintiffs in the case lost 
not because they lacked good 
facts, but because of the Court's 
stance on substantive due process 
claims under the 14th Amendment. 
No Helmets and a Refusal to Stop 
A Sacramento County, Calif., 
police officer spotted two boys at 
night riding a motorcycle without 
helmets. He ,gave chase because he 
thought the youths had refused 
another officer's command to stop. 
The 1.3-mile pursuit hit speeds up 
to 100 miles per hour before the 
motorcycle stalled and the officer's 
car hit the passenger, killing him. 
The officer's actions failed to 
meet the Court's "shocks the con-
science" test. In adopting the stan-
dard, the Court tried to explain 
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what it is and why it was not ap-
plied last year in Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, which 
held there was no substantive due 
process right to physician-assisted 
suicide. 
The difference between 
the decisions may be their 
authors. Chief Justice Wil-
liam H. Rehnquist relied on 
history and precedent to re-
ject a substantive due pro-
cess right to die in Glucks-
berg. 
Justice David H. Souter, 
in contrast, relied on neither 
to reject the 14th Amend-
ment claim in Lewis. Instead 
he added a new liability re-
quirement-the officers' ac-
tions must be shocking. This 
condition applies to chal-
lenges to executive action 
but not to legislation, which 
was at issue in Glucksberg. 
Under the shock-the-
conscience test, plaintiffs must 
prove that executive officials acted 
egregiously. What constitutes such 
conduct depends upon whether offi-
cials were forced to make a quick 
decision. 
For example, deliberate indif-
Two High Court 
cases make clear that a Fourth 
Amendment seizure is no accident. 
In Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 
U.S. 593 (1989), the justices held 
that use of a police roadblock to 
stop the driver of a stolen auto-
mobile qualifies as a seizure. But 
the Court found no seizure in 
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 
621 (1991), when a fleeing youth, 
chased by an officer on foot, tossed 
away a rock of crack cocaine. 
LOS ANGELES TIMES/ MARK BOSTER 
Under the holdings of these 
cases, officers must intentionally 
use means that in fact stop the pur-
sued person. Courts use an objec-
tive test to determine intent, ask-
ing whether a reasonable officer 
would have thought that the means 
applied would cause a stop. 
Winners and Losers In Seizure Cases 
Distinguishing accidents from 
intentional acts can challenge the 
most creative lawyers. Here are 
some winning and losing arguments 
on what constitutes a seizure: 
• Loser: Police stayed with a 
pursued driver, knowing a crash 
was likely. Brower suggests that no 
seizure occurs in this situation. 
• Loser: The officers followed 
too closely, knowing there was not 
enough room to stop if the pursued 
lost control. In Lewis, the plaintiff 
alleged that the police officer 
was only 100 feet away when he 
needed 650 feet to stop at his rate 
of speed. The Court implicitly re-
jected this argument. 
• Possible winner: Officers 
intentionally sideswiped the pur-
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sued's car. United States v. $32,400 Circle 41 on Reader Service Card 
in U.S. Currency, 82 F. 3d 135 (7th I.;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;::====:::==============~ Cir. 1996), said a seizure occurs if 
contact between vehicles stops the 
pursued auto. 
• Possible winner: Officers 
shot at the car. In Cole v. Bone, 9!;)3 
F.2d 1328 (8th Cir. 1993), the court 
held such gUnfire is a seizure if 
the driver stops as a result. 
• Possible winner: Police used 
a rolling roadblock, surrounding 
the pursued vehicle with their 
cruisers and gradually slowing it 
down. The pursued crashes or vol-
untarily stops. The latter is a 
seizure, but whether the former is 
depends upon the evidence. In 
White v. Tamlyn, 961 F. Supp. 1047 
(E.D. Mich. 1997), the court held no 
seizure occurred when there was 
no evidence of an intent to stop the 
pursued by physical impact. 
• Possible winner: Police used 
a stationary roadblock. A stop· de-
termines whether a seizure oc-
curred. Brower suggests that crash-
ing into the roadblock will not 
nullify the seizure, unless the road-
block was small and did not. effec-
tively bar further travel. 
High-speed pursuits are costly. 
Not only do insurance premiums 
rise, but people also die. In time, lit-
igation under the Fourth Amend-
ment may persuade police to give 
up the chase. • 
cCORKLE 
COURT REPORTERS, INC. 
Chicagos 
Largest 
Agency 
Full Reporting Services, 
Including: 
• Video Conferencing 
• Video Depositions 
• Conference Rooms 
• Realtime Transcription 
Using CaseView® 
200 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 300 
Chicago, Illinois 60601-1014 
(Toll-Free) 1-800-McCorkle 
(622-6755) 
(In Chicago) (312) 263-0052 (Fax) 312-263-7494 
WWW.MCDEP.COM 
E-Mail: CHIVID@AOL.COM 
Reference Martindale-Hubbell 
Circle 8 on Reader Service Card 
ABA JOURNAL / SEPTEMBER 1998 37 
- SUPREME COURT REPORT 
A Constitutional Siesta 
Court focuses on statutory interpretation and common law 
BY DEBRA CASSENS 
It was a relatively quiet term 
on the constitutional front. 
As the U.S. Supreme Court is-
sued a last-minute flurry of rulings 
in late June, the news was mostly 
about statutory development. 
Interpreting four federal laws, 
the justices gave new protections 
to victims of workplace harassment 
and those with disabling medical 
conditions, but it made lawsuits 
more difficult for sexually abused 
students and citizens claiming some 
government civil rights violations. 
Even Swidler & Berlin v. Unit-
ed States, which held that commu-
nications between a lawyer and 
client remain privileged after the 
client's death, was about develop-
ment of common law. 
Skirting the Big Issues 
Despite the huge potential im-
pact of those rulings on ordinary 
people, there wasn't much to make 
a con law professor's heart go pitter-
patter. Out of 95 opinions, 
there were no religion 
cases, no federalism 
cases and-with the last-minute 
settlement of a white teacher's suit 
against a Piscataway, N.J., school 
board-no affirmative action cases. 
There were only two rulings 
on free speech: NEA u. Finley, which 
permitted the National Endowment 
for the Arts to consider decency 
when awarding arts grants, and 
Arkansas Educational Television 
Commission v. Forbes, which per-
mitted public television stations 
to exclude minor-party candidates 
from televised debates. 
The sleeper term is in stark 
contrast to the 1996-97 term, when 
the Court struck down laws pro-
tecting religious liberty, requiring 
state background checks of gun 
buyers and barring indecency on 
the Internet. 
"Maybe the theme of this term 
is that the Court is sitting back and 
letting the nation react to some of 
the more ambitious decisions of the 
prior year," suggests Neal Devins, a 
law professor with the College of 
William and Mary's law school. 
The justices appear to be tak-
ing a breather at a time some mem-
bers of Congress have been com-
plaining of judicial activism. "Once 
the dust settles the Court may be 
willing to pursue things in a more 
venturesome way," he says. 
Akhil Reed Amar, a professor 
at Yale Law School, prefers to ana-
lyze the term in the larger context. 
Looking at the past few years, he 
sees a Court that is, well, increas-
ingly cocky in overruling co-equal 
branches of government. 
"Judicial review occurs all the 
time but typically against state and 
local government, not against acts 
of Congres~," Amar says. "This is 
a Court that, by historical stan-
dards, thinks very well of its inter-
pretive confidence vis-a-vis the oth-
er branches." 
That attitude was wo"\[en into 
the Court's biggest constitutional 
ruling of the term, Clinton u. City of 
New York, which struck down the 
line-item veto, he says. 
Amar is also watching another 
trend: the Court's general reluc-
tance to extend the Warren Court's 
pro-defendant rulings. In the last 
half-dozen years or so, Amar can't 
recall any case in which the Court 
excluded evidence that was alleged 
to have been illegally seized. 
The pattern continued last 
term, when the Court ruled in 
Pennsylvania Board of Probation v. 
Scott that the exclusionary rule 
does not apply to parole revocation 
hearings. Another anti-defense rul-
ing, United States v. Balsys, held 
that the privilege against self-in-
crimination does not apply if the 
suspect cites only a fear of foreign 
prosecution. 
The criminal rulings were part 
of a term in which the Court just 
seemed to be doing less, says Ron-
ald Rotunda, a law professor at the 
University of Illinois College of Law. 
"On the whole it was a relatively 
quiet year," he says. 
Commentators are split on 
whether the uneventful term was by 
design or happenstance. In Devins' 
view, the Court purposefully avoid-
ed controversy. "It made a decision 
that it didn't want to go out of its 
way to bring issues to the fore." 
But to Erwin Chemerinsky, a 
professor at the Uni-
versity of South-
ern California 
Law Center, it is wrong to assume 
the justices act with a unified pur-
pose. "In reality cert grants are the 
product offour individual votes," he 
points out. 
Besides, the Court had been 
willing to jump back into the affir-
mative action fray in Piscataway 
Board of Education v. Taxman. It 
was brought by a white teacher 
challenging a school board decision 
to preserve diversity by laying her 
off instead of a black teacher. The 
plaintiff dropped the case after she 
accepted a six-figure settlement col-
lected by civil rights groups. 
Numbers Tell the Storv 
Left with few constitutional 
rulings to explore, Court pundits 
are watching individual justices and 
charting the ideological divides. 
They note that Justice Antho-
ny M. Kennedy is surpassing Jus-
tice Sandra Day O'Connor as the 
swing vote on the Court, and that 
conservative Justices Antonin Sca-
lia and Clarence Thomas are part-
ing ways in more cases. 
Chief Justice William H. Rehn-
quist and Kennedy had the closest 
voting relationship this past term, 
highlighting the chief justice's 
movement toward 
the center, says 
Tom Gold-
stein of Boies & Schiller in Wash-
ington, D.C., an adjunct law profes-
sor with American University's law 
school who collects Court statistics. 
His numbers show that Ken-
nedy was in the majority in 13 of 
16 cases decided on a 5-4 vote. Out 
of 95 cases, Kennedy or O'Connor 
were in the majority in 94. "It's al-
most impossible to win without one 
of those two voting with you," Gold-
stein says. 
In the 1995-96 and 1996-97 
terms, Thomas and Scalia were on 
the same side in all 5-4 decisions. 
But last term they were on opposite 
sides in four such cases, including 
U.S. v. Bajakajian in which Thom-
as joined the majority in finding 
a forfeiture to be constitutionally 
excessive. In the other decisions, 
Scalia dissented in favor of criminal 
· defendants based on statutory in-
terpretation. 
All in all, the Court was fairly 
cohesive, issuing 9-0 rulings in 4 7 
cases. Rotunda, who is also a spe-
cial consultant to independent coun-
sel Kenneth Starr, wonders if some 
of the unanimous decisions revers-
ing lower courts are evidence of ap-
pellate activism. "This is bad news 
for litigants because it creates more 
uncertainty in the law if .... judges 
read Supreme Court opinions so 
differently." 
On the other hand, some lower 
courts may be missing changes in 
the law because the Court is issu-
ing stealth opinions. "The Supreme 
Court is not flamboyantly announc-
ing these larger trends," says Amar. 
While the Court did clear up 
some confusion last term-in statu-
tory rulings like Faragher v. Boca 
Raton arid Burlington v. Ellerth-
there will be plenty of questions left 
for the lower courts to decide. 
Those two High Court deci-
sions made clear that employers 
are vicariously liable for sexual ha-
rassment by supervisors, even if 
there is no tangible harm. Compa-
nies can claim an affirmative de-
fense, though, if they took reason-
able steps to prevent the harass-
ment and the employee unreason-
ably failed to use those mechanisms. 
But Chemerinsky asks who 
qualifies as a supervisor? What 
policies to prevent the harassment 
are sufficient? He and others will 
watch the legal developments at 
the same time they await the next 
blockbuster constitutional case. 
The last term could simply be the 
calm before the storm. • 
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